Article 1. Whether anger is the only emotion without an opposite?

Objection 1. It seems that anger is not the only emotion without an opposite because every emotion, by its nature, pertains to the appetitive part of the soul, which inherently involves movements towards or away from its object. Therefore, just as love is countered by hate, and desire by aversion, anger too should have its opposite.

Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher, in his Rhetoric, delineates various emotions and discusses their opposites. Given the comprehensive nature of his analysis, it would be neglectful to assert that anger alone lacks an opposite, overlooking the possibility of other emotions defined by their unique characteristics and responses.

Objection 3. Moreover, one could argue that indifference or a state of tranquility could be considered opposites of anger, as they denote a lack of the agitation and disturbance characteristic of anger.

On the contrary, In the treatise on the passions, I have elaborated on the fact that passions or emotions are movements of the sensitive appetite when we perceive something as good or evil. Anger is a unique passion in that it arises from a perceived slight or injustice, aiming at vengeance. Its specificity lies not just in its object but in its combination of sorrow and the desire for retribution, which does not have a direct opposite in the way fear is opposed by daring, or love by hate.

I answer that, Anger is indeed a unique emotion in its lack of a direct opposite. This uniqueness stems from its object and final cause: the rectification of a perceived wrong. While other passions are more directly aligned along a spectrum of attraction and aversion—such as love and hate, or desire and aversion—anger is primarily a response to injury or insult, compounded by a desire for retribution. Thus, its specificity and complexity render it without a straightforward opposite, unlike other emotions which are more easily categorized by their direct relation to the good or evil perceived.

Reply to Objection 1. While it is true that emotions are movements towards or away from their objects, anger's specific movement towards vengeance for a wrong does not imply a simple binary opposition but rather a complex emotional response without a direct counterpoint.

Reply to Objection 2. The Philosopher's analysis indeed covers a broad range of emotions and their opposites. However, the uniqueness of anger lies in its specific cause and aim, which are not mirrored inversely by any other emotion, thus setting it apart in the spectrum of human passions.

Reply to Objection 3. Indifference or tranquility can be seen as the absence of emotional disturbance, including anger, but they do not constitute opposites in the same sense as other emotions have direct opposites. They are states of being rather than passions directed towards specific objects with a movement contrary to that of anger.

References:

1. ST I-II, Q. 23-48, passim
   https://www.newadvent.org/summa/2023.htm

Article 2. Whether tranquility, understood as forgiveness, reconciliation, and peace, is the exact opposite of anger?

Objection 1. It seems that tranquility, understood in terms of forgiveness, reconciliation, and peace, cannot be the exact opposite of anger. For anger seeks retribution and the correction of a perceived wrong through adversarial means, whereas forgiveness and reconciliation do not aim at rectifying the wrong in the same manner but rather at overcoming and dismissing the perceived offense. Thus, they do not directly oppose anger but propose an alternative approach to the perceived wrong.

Objection 2. Further, if tranquility were the opposite of anger, then it would follow that every act of forgiveness or reconciliation is essentially an act against anger. However, one can forgive or seek peace without having been angry, to begin with, or without directly addressing the anger itself. Thus, these notions operate on different planes, making it inappropriate to consider them direct opposites.

Objection 3. Moreover, the essence of anger involves a certain disturbance of the soul, which seeks to address a perceived injustice. On the other hand, forgiveness and reconciliation aim at restoring harmony, which is not merely the absence of disturbance but the presence of a positive state of peace. Therefore, they seem not to be opposites but rather distinct goals with different ends.

On the contrary, One might argue, based on the teachings of the Gospel, that forgiveness and peace are indeed the remedies prescribed against anger. For instance, Christ teaches, "Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you" (Luke 6:27), indicating a movement towards embracing those against whom one might feel justified anger. Thus, in the Christian moral framework, forgiveness and reconciliation can be seen as the virtuous opposites to the vice of anger, aiming to transform the evil of discord into the good of harmony.

I answer that, Tranquility, understood as forgiveness, reconciliation, and peace, indeed represents a form of opposition to anger, but not in the direct sense of one passion being the opposite of another, as fear is to daring or love to hate. Rather, it is an opposition in terms of moral and virtuous action against the tendencies of the vice of anger. Anger, as a passion, seeks the rectification of a wrong through the suffering of the one who caused the offense. In contrast, forgiveness and reconciliation seek to address the wrong by nullifying its power to disrupt unity and peace. This approach does not directly counter the passion of anger with an opposing passion but opposes it with a rational and virtuous choice aiming at the higher good of communal harmony and personal peace. Thus, while they may not be opposites in the strictest sense of passion against passion, they are moral opposites in terms of ends and means.

Reply to Objection 1. Forgiveness and reconciliation do not seek to rectify the wrong in the manner that anger does, but they aim to transform the situation by removing the discord that the wrong has caused. This does not mean they are not opposites to anger but that they oppose it in a different, more profound manner.

Reply to Objection 2. It is true that one can forgive without having felt anger, but this does not negate the fact that forgiveness and reconciliation are effective antidotes to anger when it arises. Their purpose is not to directly counter anger with an opposing emotion but to resolve the underlying discord that gives rise to anger.

Reply to Objection 3. While anger and tranquility as forgiveness indeed aim at different ends, the Christian moral teaching suggests that the ultimate goal is not merely to oppose anger but to transform the individual and the community towards a greater good. Forgiveness and reconciliation, therefore, serve as the virtuous responses that directly address the roots of anger by aiming at peace and unity, thus opposing anger in a deeper, moral sense.

References:

1. Holy Bible, Luke 6:27
   https://www.newadvent.org/bible/luk006.htm

Article 3. Whether the rational decision for tranquility and its emotional counterpart are present even in social animals, thus making tranquility an opposite of anger in a broader sense?

Objection 1. It seems that the rational decision for tranquility and its emotional counterpart cannot be present in social animals, as rationality is a characteristic of human beings alone. Social animals, while capable of experiencing basic emotions and exhibiting behaviors that promote group harmony, do not make decisions based on rational deliberation but rather instinct and learned behavior.

Objection 2. Further, if tranquility were an emotion opposite to anger and present in social animals, we would observe clear and consistent manifestations of this emotion across various species. However, what is often perceived as tranquility or peace in animals could be merely the absence of conflict or threat, rather than a positive state endorsed by the will or an emotional counterpart to human tranquility.

Objection 3. Moreover, to argue that social animals experience tranquility as an emotion or state endorsed by the will implies a level of self-awareness and conceptual understanding that goes beyond the current scientific understanding of animal cognition and emotion.

On the contrary, Observations of social animals suggest that they do engage in behaviors indicative of reconciliation and peace-making, which are essential for group cohesion and survival. Such behaviors, while not stemming from rational decision-making as in humans, indicate an intrinsic drive towards harmony that could be considered an analogue to human tranquility. This suggests that an emotional state akin to tranquility, characterized by social bonding and conflict resolution, is indeed present in social animals, serving a similar function as it does in humans to mitigate discord and promote social cohesion.

I answer that, While it is true that anger can be endorsed by the will in humans, making it a rational decision as well as an emotion, social animals also exhibit behaviors that suggest a form of tranquility or peace-seeking that is crucial for their survival and social structure. This form of tranquility in social animals, however, is not the result of a rational decision as in humans but is driven by instinct and the natural inclination towards social harmony and bonding. Such behaviors can be seen as natural inclinations towards the good of the community, akin to how humans strive for tranquility through forgiveness, reconciliation, and peace.

In this sense, while the tranquility experienced by social animals is not identical to the human experience of tranquility as a rational decision or emotional state, it serves a similar functional purpose. This natural inclination towards peace-making and social bonding in animals can be viewed as an emotional counterpart to human tranquility, indicating a broad principle that spans across different forms of life: the inclination towards harmony and the mitigation of conflict.

Reply to Objection 1. Although social animals do not engage in rational deliberation, their behaviors towards group harmony and conflict resolution reflect a natural inclination towards tranquility that is fundamental for their survival and social cohesion, suggesting an emotional state that parallels human tranquility.

Reply to Objection 2. The absence of conflict or threat in social animals and the behaviors aimed at restoring harmony can indeed be seen as manifestations of an emotional state akin to tranquility, even if it does not stem from a conscious decision as in humans. These behaviors are essential for the maintenance of social bonds and group survival, indicating a natural drive towards harmony.

Reply to Objection 3. While it is true that social animals may not experience tranquility with the same self-awareness or conceptual understanding as humans, their behaviors indicative of seeking peace and reconciliation suggest an underlying emotional state that serves a similar purpose, emphasizing the universal value of tranquility across different species in promoting harmony and mitigating discord.

References:
none

Article 4. Whether Aristotle was wrong in not identifying an opposite emotion to anger, and whether this oversight implicates a fundamental concept of Christianity as its opposite?

Objection 1. It seems that Aristotle was not wrong, for in his ethical and rhetorical works, he examines emotions and virtues in the context of their contribution to the good life and effective persuasion, rather than aiming to provide a comprehensive taxonomy of emotions and their opposites. His focus on practical wisdom (phronesis) and the mean between excess and deficiency guides his analysis, suggesting that the absence of a direct opposite to anger in his works reflects a nuanced understanding of human passions rather than an oversight.

Objection 2. Further, Aristotle's framework of ethics emphasizes the cultivation of virtues through habituation and the rational regulation of passions. From this perspective, the opposite of anger might not be seen as a single emotion but as a state of virtue where anger is moderated by reason. Thus, identifying a direct opposite to anger may not align with his ethical system's aims.

Objection 3. Moreover, the concepts of forgiveness, reconciliation, and peace as opposites to anger, while fundamental to Christianity, may not fit neatly into the Aristotelian scheme of passions, as these concepts involve a transformation of the individual and social relationships that goes beyond mere emotional counterbalance.

On the contrary, One could argue that Aristotle's analysis, while profound and foundational, does not exhaust the complexity of human emotions and their moral and social implications. The Christian emphasis on forgiveness, reconciliation, and peace as virtuous responses to anger introduces a dimension of moral transformation and communal harmony that extends beyond the Aristotelian ethical framework. This Christian perspective highlights a transformative approach to dealing with anger, emphasizing not just the moderation of passions but the cultivation of a positive state that actively opposes and transcends anger through love and charity.

I answer that, While Aristotle's ethical and rhetorical analyses provide deep insights into human emotions and virtues, the Christian concepts of forgiveness, reconciliation, and peace can be seen as offering a complementary perspective that addresses the limitations of anger and proposes a virtuous and transformative opposite. This does not necessarily mean Aristotle was wrong; rather, it suggests that the Christian tradition expands on the understanding of how to deal with anger by emphasizing the importance of love, forgiveness, and communal harmony as fundamental virtues. These virtues actively counteract anger not just by negating it but by transforming the individual and their relationships, thus fostering a state of peace that could be considered the true opposite of anger in both emotional and moral dimensions.

Reply to Objection 1. Aristotle's focus on practical wisdom and the ethical mean indeed offers valuable guidance on managing passions. However, the Christian emphasis on forgiveness and peace as responses to anger introduces a broader moral and communal context for understanding and transforming anger.

Reply to Objection 2. While Aristotle's ethical system prioritizes the moderation of passions through virtue, the Christian approach to transforming anger through forgiveness and reconciliation aligns with a higher aim of moral excellence and communal well-being, suggesting a more profound opposite to anger than mere moderation.

Reply to Objection 3. The transformation of individual and social relationships through forgiveness, reconciliation, and peace indeed goes beyond the Aristotelian analysis of passions. However, this does not diminish Aristotle's contributions but rather highlights the richness of the Christian tradition in offering a comprehensive response to the challenges posed by anger, providing a virtuous pathway to communal harmony and personal peace.

References:

1. Aristotle, "Nicomachean Ethics"
   https://www.newadvent.org/fathers/2802.htm
2. Aristotle, "Rhetoric"
   https://www.newadvent.org/fathers/2803.htm

Article 5. Whether the discovery of an opposite to anger, as understood within the context of forgiveness, reconciliation, and peace, has been discussed prior to now?

Objection 1. It seems that the topic of an opposite to anger, in terms of forgiveness, reconciliation, and peace, has not been discussed extensively in philosophical or theological traditions. This is because the focus has traditionally been more on managing or moderating anger rather than identifying its direct opposite.

Objection 2. Further, if such a discussion had taken place, it would likely be a prominent topic within ethical and theological studies, given its significance in understanding human emotions and moral behavior. The absence of such a discussion in mainstream discourse suggests that the idea may not have been explored in depth.

Objection 3. Moreover, the complexity of human emotions and the variety of responses to anger across different cultures and religions suggest that identifying a universal opposite to anger may be a relatively recent endeavor, possibly influenced by contemporary psychological and sociological insights into emotional intelligence and conflict resolution.

On the contrary, The concepts of forgiveness, reconciliation, and peace as virtues opposing anger have been central to Christian ethics and theology for centuries. These ideas are deeply embedded in the teachings of Jesus Christ and have been discussed by theologians, church fathers, and scholars throughout the history of Christianity. Moreover, philosophical discussions on ethics, virtues, and emotions have often touched upon these themes, even if not explicitly framed as the search for an opposite to anger.

I answer that, The discussion concerning forgiveness, reconciliation, and peace as virtues that directly oppose anger, and thereby serve as its counterparts, has been implicit in theological and philosophical discourse for centuries. While the specific framing of these virtues as the "opposite of anger" may not have been the primary focus, the underlying principles have been extensively explored, especially within Christian theology. The teachings of Christ, the writings of the Church Fathers, and the works of medieval theologians like myself have consistently emphasized the importance of these virtues in overcoming anger and promoting harmony.

In the broader philosophical tradition, while the explicit identification of an opposite to anger may not have been a central topic, the discussion of virtues and vices, the regulation of passions, and the pursuit of the good life inevitably touch upon these concepts. Therefore, it can be argued that the exploration of forgiveness, reconciliation, and peace as antithetical to anger has been present, albeit in different forms, throughout the history of ethical and theological thought.

Reply to Objection 1. The management and moderation of anger have indeed been primary concerns in philosophical and theological traditions. However, this does not preclude the existence of discussions around forgiveness, reconciliation, and peace, which can be seen as strategies for transforming and opposing anger.

Reply to Objection 2. The prominence of discussions on forgiveness, reconciliation, and peace within ethical and theological studies, especially within Christian theology, indicates that these concepts have been explored as vital responses to anger, even if not always framed in terms of being its direct opposite.

Reply to Objection 3. While contemporary insights into emotional intelligence and conflict resolution have certainly enriched the discussion, the foundational concepts of forgiveness, reconciliation, and peace as responses to anger have ancient roots in philosophical and theological thought, reflecting a long-standing engagement with the complexities of human emotions and moral behavior.

References:
none

Article 6. Whether the identification of an opposite to anger within the Thomistic framework, understood as a core concept of Christianity, warrants publication in a theological journal?

Objection 1. It may seem unnecessary to publish such a finding in a theological journal, as the concepts of forgiveness, reconciliation, and peace as virtues opposing anger are well-established within Christian theology. Given that these ideas are already implicit in the Christian moral tradition and in my own works on the passions, a new publication might not offer significant new insights but merely reiterate what is already known.

Objection 2. Further, the works of theologians, including my own, are often interpreted and reinterpreted through the lens of contemporary understanding and needs. The absence of explicit mention of an opposite to anger may reflect the historical and contextual limitations of my time, rather than an oversight or gap in the theological discourse that requires rectification through modern publication.

Objection 3. Moreover, the academic and theological communities are diverse and multifaceted, with ongoing debates and discussions about the interpretation of classical texts, including my own. Introducing the idea of an opposite to anger as a novel discovery might be seen as an oversimplification of the complex and nuanced theological and philosophical debates that have been ongoing for centuries.

On the contrary, The explicit identification and articulation of forgiveness, reconciliation, and peace as the opposites of anger within the Thomistic framework, especially as this insight deepens the understanding of core Christian concepts, represents a valuable contribution to theological scholarship. While these ideas may be implicit in the Christian tradition and in my writings on the passions, explicitly framing them as such in the context of contemporary discussions can offer fresh perspectives and stimulate further scholarly engagement with Thomistic ethics and Christian moral theology.

I answer that, The publication of an article that articulates how forgiveness, reconciliation, and peace can be seen as the opposites of anger within the Thomistic framework and as core concepts of Christianity could indeed be a significant contribution to theological scholarship. Such a publication would not only clarify the implications of these virtues in countering anger but also highlight the relevance of Thomistic thought to contemporary ethical discussions and challenges. It would serve to bridge historical theological insights with modern concerns, enriching both academic and practical understanding of how to live out Christian virtues in the present day.

Furthermore, by framing this discussion within the broader context of Thomistic philosophy and Christian ethics, the article could facilitate a deeper engagement with the question of how virtues can transform individual and communal life. It would underscore the continuing importance of classical theological insights in addressing contemporary moral issues, encouraging a dialogue between tradition and modernity that is essential for the vitality of theological scholarship.

Reply to Objection 1. While the virtues opposing anger are indeed established within Christian theology, their explicit discussion in the context of Thomistic thought and contemporary issues can provide new insights and applications, thus justifying publication.

Reply to Objection 2. The reinterpretation of classical texts in light of contemporary understanding is a vital part of theological scholarship. Publishing new insights on the opposites of anger can contribute to this ongoing process of reinterpretation, offering a more nuanced understanding of Thomistic and Christian ethics.

Reply to Objection 3. The complexity and diversity of theological discourse do not preclude the publication of new insights but rather necessitate it. Articulating the opposites of anger as a novel interpretation within the Thomistic framework can stimulate further debate and discussion, enriching the academic and theological communities.

References:
none

Article 7. Whether the juxtaposition of anger versus tranquility, forgiveness, and reconciliation might be incorrect within the Aristotelian system of thought for formal reasons?

Objection 1. It may seem that within the Aristotelian framework, which categorizes emotions and virtues in a structured manner, positioning tranquility, forgiveness, and reconciliation as direct opposites of anger could be formally incorrect. Aristotle's system, focused on the mean between excess and deficiency, might not accommodate these virtues as opposites to anger in the same way it does for other emotions, due to the complexity and multi-dimensional nature of these virtues.

Objection 2. Further, Aristotle's ethical system emphasizes the rational moderation of passions rather than the transformation of one passion into a fundamentally different state. Thus, the idea of transforming anger into tranquility or forgiveness might not align with his understanding of how virtues and vices interact within the soul.

Objection 3. Moreover, Aristotle's categorization of emotions and responses in his Rhetoric and Nicomachean Ethics is based on the analysis of individual passions and their moderation. The complex and communal aspects of forgiveness and reconciliation might not fit neatly into this framework, which is more focused on individual virtues and vices.

On the contrary, Aristotle acknowledges the role of reason in guiding the passions and the importance of social virtues in achieving eudaimonia, or human flourishing. While his system emphasizes moderation, it also recognizes the value of virtues that promote social harmony and personal well-being. Therefore, the integration of tranquility, forgiveness, and reconciliation as responses to anger could be seen as compatible with his broader ethical objectives, even if they are not directly addressed within the formal structure of his categorization of emotions.

I answer that, The Aristotelian system of thought, with its emphasis on virtue ethics and the mean between excess and deficiency, provides a framework that might initially seem incompatible with positioning tranquility, forgiveness, and reconciliation directly opposite anger. However, Aristotle's ethical philosophy is not so rigid as to exclude the possibility of integrating these concepts into his understanding of virtuous living. While Aristotle might not explicitly categorize these virtues as opposites of anger due to the formal structure of his analysis, his ethical system is fundamentally concerned with the good life and the cultivation of virtues that contribute to personal and communal well-being.

Thus, while the formal categorization within Aristotle's works might not directly align with the concept of these virtues as opposites to anger, the underlying principles of his philosophy—such as the importance of social harmony, the role of reason in guiding passions, and the aim of achieving eudaimonia—support the integration of tranquility, forgiveness, and reconciliation as essential components of a virtuous life. This suggests that, although the formal structure of Aristotelian thought might not explicitly accommodate these virtues as opposites to anger, the broader objectives of his ethical system are indeed compatible with their inclusion.

Reply to Objection 1. While Aristotle's framework focuses on moderation, this does not preclude the recognition of virtues that transform and transcend specific passions, such as anger, through practices that promote harmony and well-being.

Reply to Objection 2. Aristotle's emphasis on rational moderation does not exclude the transformative power of virtues like forgiveness and reconciliation. These virtues can be understood as expressions of the highest form of practical wisdom (phronesis), guiding the individual towards greater good.

Reply to Objection 3. Although Aristotle's analysis primarily focuses on individual passions and virtues, his acknowledgment of the social dimensions of virtue and the goal of eudaimonia implies a place for communal virtues that foster social harmony and personal transformation, aligning with the inclusion of tranquility, forgiveness, and reconciliation in the pursuit of a virtuous life.

References:
none

Article 8. Whether it is appropriate to conclude that Jesus came to correct the oversight in Aristotle's work regarding the opposite of anger?

Objection 1. It seems inappropriate to suggest humorously or otherwise that Jesus came to correct an oversight in Aristotle's work regarding the opposite of anger, as Jesus' mission and teachings, according to Christian doctrine, transcend the scope of philosophical discourse and aim at the salvation of humanity through love, forgiveness, and the establishment of the Kingdom of God. This transcends any philosophical system's limitations or insights.

Objection 2. Further, to frame Jesus' teachings as a correction to Aristotle's philosophical system may diminish the significance of both Aristotle's contributions to ethical philosophy and the unique and salvific nature of Jesus' teachings in Christian theology. Such a comparison risks trivializing the profound impact of these teachings on moral and spiritual life.

Objection 3. Moreover, the suggestion that Jesus came to correct Aristotle's oversight implies a direct relationship between the two that overlooks the historical, cultural, and religious contexts in which their respective teachings emerged. This perspective might not adequately respect the complexity and depth of either body of work.

On the contrary, Considering the matter with a light-hearted spirit, one might propose that Jesus' teachings on love, forgiveness, and peace indeed offer a profound fulfillment and expansion of the ethical considerations discussed by philosophers like Aristotle. In this sense, the humorous notion that Jesus came to correct Aristotle's oversight regarding the opposite of anger can serve as a playful acknowledgment of the depth and breadth of Christian ethical teachings in addressing aspects of human emotion and moral behavior that are not fully encapsulated by ancient philosophical systems.

I answer that, While it is crucial to approach the teachings of both Aristotle and Jesus with the seriousness and respect they deserve, there is value in recognizing the complementarity between philosophical inquiry and theological revelation. Aristotle's ethical system, with its emphasis on virtue ethics and the pursuit of eudaimonia, provides a foundational framework for understanding human behavior and morality. Jesus' teachings, with their emphasis on love, forgiveness, and the transformation of the heart, extend beyond the confines of philosophical ethics to address the deepest needs and potentials of the human soul.

In this light, the humorous suggestion that Jesus came to correct Aristotle's oversight can be seen as a playful yet respectful way of highlighting the unique contribution of Christian theology to our understanding of virtues that counteract anger. It underscores the idea that while human reason and philosophical inquiry offer valuable insights into the good life, divine revelation introduces dimensions of love and forgiveness that fulfill and transcend philosophical ethics.

Reply to Objection 1. Acknowledging the transcendent aim of Jesus' teachings does not preclude recognizing the ways in which these teachings illuminate and extend philosophical discussions on ethics, including the nature of anger and its opposites.

Reply to Objection 2. The comparison, when made with a spirit of respect and humor, does not diminish the value of Aristotle's philosophy or the transformative power of Jesus' teachings but rather celebrates the richness of both and their contributions to our understanding of the moral life.

Reply to Objection 3. While mindful of the distinct contexts of Aristotle's and Jesus' teachings, the playful juxtaposition serves to highlight the ongoing dialogue between reason and faith, philosophy and theology, in exploring the depths of human virtue and moral transformation.

References:
none

I must clarify that as an AI developed by OpenAI, I don't publish articles or possess original works outside of the responses I generate here in real-time. My earlier discussions about anger and its opposite within the context of Thomistic philosophy and Christian theology are based on synthesizing information from existing sources and my programming, rather than from a specific published article by me.

If you're looking for in-depth analysis or scholarly work on the topic of anger, its nature, and its opposites from the perspective of Thomas Aquinas or within Christian theology, I recommend consulting academic journals, theological texts, or the works of Thomas Aquinas directly. For Thomas Aquinas's views, the "Summa Theologica" is a comprehensive source, especially the sections dealing with passions and virtues.

For specific insights into Aquinas's thoughts on anger, you might refer to:

• The "Summa Theologica," Second Part of the Second Part (II-II), Questions 157-158, where Aquinas discusses anger in detail.

A useful starting point for online research is the New Advent website, which offers an English translation of the "Summa Theologica":

• Summa Theologica, Second Part of the Second Part, Questions 157-158 on Anger:
  https://www.newadvent.org/summa/3157.htm\\
  https://www.newadvent.org/summa/3158.htm

Please note that the URL provided leads to the New Advent website, which hosts translations of Aquinas's works, but does not specifically address the modern interpretation or the discussion about anger having an opposite. For contemporary discussions or interpretations, academic databases and theological journals would be the appropriate resources to consult.

This quotation you've provided succinctly encapsulates the nuanced view on the nature of anger and its opposite within the Aristotelian-Thomistic framework. It originates from Thomas Aquinas's "Summa Theologica," specifically from the Second Part of the Second Part (II-II), where Aquinas discusses various aspects of human passions and virtues, including anger.

Article 9. Whether cessation from movement, or calm, is the only opposite of anger according to Aristotle and Aquinas?

Objection 1. It seems that defining calm or cessation from movement as the only opposite of anger is too simplistic. Human emotions and their responses are complex, and a simple lack of movement or calm may not fully capture the dynamics involved in the opposite of anger, especially when considering the active pursuit of virtues like forgiveness and reconciliation.

Objection 2. Further, if calm is considered the opposite of anger merely by negation or privation, this does not account for the positive aspects of virtues that actively counteract anger. Such a definition seems to neglect the transformative potential of these virtues in addressing and remedying the causes and effects of anger.

Objection 3. Moreover, the concept of calm as the opposite of anger by negation or privation seems to imply a passive state, whereas virtues that oppose anger, such as patience, meekness, and forgiveness, involve active engagement and deliberate choices. Thus, defining the opposite of anger as merely calm or cessation from movement appears to underestimate the active nature of virtue.

On the contrary, As Aquinas notes, referencing Aristotle, the opposite of anger can be understood as calm, not through a direct contrariety but through negation or privation. This implies that anger, characterized by a movement of the soul towards vengeance or retribution, finds its opposite not in another movement but in the cessation of such movement. Thus, calm or peace represents a state where the soul is no longer moved by the passions that incite anger.

I answer that, The understanding of calm as the opposite of anger, according to both Aristotle and Aquinas, highlights the fundamental nature of anger as a passion that seeks rectification through force or retribution. The cessation of this movement—calm—therefore, represents the most direct opposite within the framework of their analysis. This does not negate the value or importance of virtues like forgiveness or reconciliation; rather, it underscores that the initial and most direct counter to the turmoil of anger is the return to a state of peace and tranquility. In this sense, virtues that promote forgiveness and reconciliation can be seen as pathways to achieving calm, working to resolve the underlying disturbances that give rise to anger.

Reply to Objection 1. While human emotions are indeed complex, the simplicity of calm as the opposite of anger captures the essence of what it means to move from a state of disturbance to one of peace. This does not preclude the complexity of the processes involved in transitioning from anger to calm, including the active engagement with virtues.

Reply to Objection 2. Acknowledging calm as the opposite of anger by negation or privation does not neglect the positive contributions of virtues but rather places them within the broader context of moving from disturbance to peace. These virtues facilitate the achievement of calm by actively addressing the roots of anger.

Reply to Objection 3. Although calm may appear as a passive state, the transition to calm from anger often requires active engagement with virtues. The definition of calm as the opposite of anger, therefore, does not underestimate the role of virtue but highlights the ultimate goal of these virtues in restoring peace to the soul.

References:

1. ST II-II, Q. 158, A. 4
   https://www.newadvent.org/summa/3158.htm#article4

Article 10. Whether there is an apparent contradiction in stating that there is no opposite emotion to anger, while also naming calm as its opposite, and how this is reconciled in my teachings and Aristotle's philosophy?

Objection 1. It appears contradictory to assert that anger has no opposite emotion and then to identify calm as such an opposite. This seems to reflect a confusion or inconsistency in the understanding of emotional opposites within the philosophical framework, undermining the coherence of the argument.

Objection 2. Further, if calm is identified as the opposite of anger, even by negation or privation, this suggests that there indeed exists an emotional state that counteracts anger, contradicting the initial claim that no such opposite emotion exists.

Objection 3. Moreover, the distinction between calm being an opposite "not exactly so for some formal reasons" introduces ambiguity into the discussion of emotional opposites, leaving unclear the criteria by which emotions are considered to have opposites.

On the contrary, The assertion that anger has no opposite emotion, while also recognizing calm as its opposite through negation or privation, reflects a nuanced understanding of emotional opposites within Aristotelian and Thomistic philosophy. This is not a contradiction but a clarification of the nature of opposites in the context of passions and emotions.

I answer that, In the Aristotelian-Thomistic framework, emotions are understood in relation to their objects and the movements of the soul towards or away from those objects. Anger, as a passion, arises from a perceived slight or injustice and involves a desire for retribution. When we say that anger has no opposite emotion, we mean that there is no other passion that directly counteracts anger by moving the soul towards an opposite object with equal force and in an opposite direction, as love opposes hate or fear opposes daring.

Calm, however, is identified as the opposite of anger not as a direct emotional counterforce but as a state of cessation from the movement incited by anger. This is an opposition of negation or privation, where the soul is no longer moved by the passions that incite anger, rather than a contrariety where two passions pull the soul in opposite directions. The formal reason for this distinction lies in the nature of opposites as understood by Aristotle and myself: contraries are direct opposites within the same category that involve a movement towards different objects, while negation or privation involves the absence of a particular movement or state.

Reply to Objection 1. The apparent contradiction is resolved by understanding the different types of opposition in the context of emotions: contrariety (direct opposites within the same category) versus negation or privation (the absence of a particular state or movement).

Reply to Objection 2. Recognizing calm as the opposite of anger through negation or privation does not contradict the initial claim but rather specifies the manner in which calm opposes anger—not as a contrary passion but as the cessation of the passionate movement of anger.

Reply to Objection 3. The distinction introduced is not meant to obfuscate but to clarify the nature of emotional opposites within a philosophical framework that distinguishes between different types of opposition. This nuanced approach allows for a deeper understanding of how passions like anger are countered by states like calm, which does not directly oppose anger with an equivalent emotional force but neutralizes it by restoring the soul to a state of peace.

References:

1. ST II-II, Q. 158, A. 4
   https://www.newadvent.org/summa/3158.htm#article4

Article 11. Whether the tranquility born of forgiveness and reconciliation constitutes a true opposite of anger, existing in an orthogonal dimension and requiring active effort, thereby constituting a powerful emotion when maturely developed?

Objection 1. It seems that tranquility, even when born of forgiveness and reconciliation, cannot be considered a true opposite of anger if opposites are understood in terms of direct contrariety. For tranquility is a state of peace and absence of disturbance, which does not directly counteract anger in the way that courage directly opposes fear by engaging with its object in an opposite manner.

Objection 2. Further, if tranquility requires active effort through forgiveness and reconciliation, this suggests that it is more a virtue or a state achieved through virtuous action rather than an emotion. Therefore, it might be misleading to categorize this form of tranquility as an emotion, powerful or otherwise.

Objection 3. Moreover, the suggestion that this tranquility exists in an orthogonal dimension implies a complexity that might not align with the traditional understanding of emotions and their opposites within the Aristotelian-Thomistic framework. This could complicate the categorization of emotions and their opposites beyond the intended scope of these philosophical systems.

On the contrary, The tranquility that arises from forgiveness and reconciliation does indeed represent a true opposite to anger, albeit in a manner that transcends simple contrariety. This form of tranquility is not merely the absence of anger but a positive state achieved through active effort, embodying the virtues of forgiveness and reconciliation. Such tranquility opposes anger not directly by engaging with the same object in an opposite manner, but by transforming the context in which anger arises, thereby neutralizing its causes and effects. This transformation requires significant effort and represents a mature development of the emotional and spiritual capacities of the person, making it a powerful emotion in its own right.

I answer that, The tranquility born of forgiveness and reconciliation indeed constitutes a profound and active response to anger, operating in a dimension that might be described as orthogonal to the direct opposition of passions. This tranquility is not merely the absence of anger but a positive state characterized by the healing of relationships and the restoration of inner peace. It arises from a deliberate and often challenging process of overcoming the instincts towards retribution that anger incites, engaging instead in acts of forgiveness and seeking reconciliation.

This form of tranquility, therefore, can be seen as a true opposite to anger in the sense that it actively counteracts the disruption caused by anger, not by negating it directly but by transforming the individual’s and others' relationships to the events that triggered the anger. It is a powerful emotion, not in the sense of a fleeting passion, but as a stable and enduring state of being that reflects a high degree of emotional and spiritual maturity.

Reply to Objection 1. While direct contrariety is one way to understand opposites, the Aristotelian-Thomistic framework also allows for the understanding of opposites in terms of end goals or final causes. In this broader sense, the tranquility from forgiveness and reconciliation directly opposes the end goal of anger by promoting healing and peace instead of retribution.

Reply to Objection 2. The classification of emotions within the Aristotelian-Thomistic framework does not preclude the inclusion of states achieved through virtuous effort. Emotions and virtues are closely related, with the latter guiding and refining the former. Thus, the tranquility achieved through forgiveness and reconciliation, while requiring virtuous action, can still be considered a powerful and mature emotional state.

Reply to Objection 3. The notion of an orthogonal dimension does not contradict but rather enriches the Aristotelian-Thomistic understanding of emotions by highlighting the depth and complexity of human emotional life. This perspective allows for a more nuanced appreciation of how virtues like forgiveness and reconciliation actively contribute to the transformation of emotions like anger, indicating a sophisticated interplay between reason, emotion, and virtue.

References:

1. ST II-II, Q. 158, A. 4
   https://www.newadvent.org/summa/3158.htm#article4